

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT PLANNING POLICY CONFERENCE
CO-HOSTED BY ARMY-AIR FORCE CENTER FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
AND OJCS/J5 -- RADISSON HOTEL -- HAMPTON, VA
14 DECEMBER 1988

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT:
THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR INVITING ME TO ADDRESS THIS CONFERENCE ON LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT POLICY PLANNING. THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND I, AS YOU MAY KNOW, COORDINATE THE NATIONAL LEVEL ACTIVITIES AND BUDGETS OF ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY -- INCLUDING THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA), THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA), CIA, AND THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS OF THE FBI, THE DEPARTMENTS OF ENERGY, STATE AND TREASURY AND THE MILITARY SERVICES. IT IS IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR OVERALL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RESPONSIBILITIES THAT I SPEAK TODAY, FOR THE CRITICAL ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE AMERICAN CONDUCT OF LOW INTENSITY WARFARE TRANSCENDS THE CAPABILITIES OF ANY SINGLE AGENCY. INDEED, BUREAUCRATIC PAROCHIALISM AND TURF BATTLES -- WITHIN AND AMONG POLICY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES -- HAVE IN THE PAST BEEN AN OBSTACLE TO US CONDUCT OF WAR AGAINST SUBVERSION, INSURGENCY, TERRORISM AND NARCOTICS.

NEARLY THREE YEARS AGO, IN JANUARY 1986, SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ SAID "LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IS THE PRIME CHALLENGE WE WILL FACE, AT LEAST THROUGH THE REMAINDER OF THIS CENTURY. THE FUTURE OF PEACE AND FREEDOM MAY WELL DEPEND ON HOW EFFECTIVELY WE MEET IT." THAT SAME MONTH, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WEINBERGER SAID, "MUCH HAS BEEN WRITTEN ABOUT LOW INTENSITY WARFARE, BUT IT REMAINS AN OPEN QUESTION HOW MUCH IS UNDERSTOOD. OF GREATER CERTAINTY IS THE FACT THAT LITTLE OF WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD HAS BEEN APPLIED EFFECTIVELY."

IN MY DDCI CONFIRMATION HEARINGS IN THE SPRING OF 1986 I SAID THAT "WE FACE A VERY COMPLICATED INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS ARE FIGHTING SOVIET AGGRESSION IN THEIR COUNTRY. THERE ARE GROUPS RESISTING THE IMPOSITION OF MARXIST-LENINIST REGIMES SUPPORTED BY THE SOVIET UNION, CUBA AND VIETNAM IN THEIR COUNTRIES. THE SOVIETS HAVE A VERY ACTIVE COVERT ACTION PROGRAM AIMED AT POLITICAL DESTABILIZATION THAT WE ESTIMATE BROADLY IS COSTING THEM ON THE ORDER OF \$4 BILLION A YEAR. WE ARE CONFRONTING PROBLEMS IN THE WORLD OF NARCOTICS, TERRORISM, PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, AND A HOST OF OTHER PROBLEMS. I THINK THAT THE EXPERIENCE OF THE LAST 10 YEARS WOULD SUGGEST THAT IN MANY OF THESE CASES, DIPLOMACY ALONE IS NOT AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT. I THINK THAT EXPERIENCE ALSO WOULD SHOW THAT IN MANY OF THESE INSTANCES, OVERT MILITARY ACTION BY THE UNITED STATES IS EITHER NOT APPROPRIATE, OR WOULD NOT BE SUPPORTED BY

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE OR THE CONGRESS. AT THAT POINT, THE UNITED STATES HAS TWO OPTIONS. IT CAN DEVELOP OTHER INSTRUMENTS BY WHICH TO CARRY OUT ITS POLICY AND TO TRY AND PROTECT ITS INTERESTS, OR IT CAN TURN AND WALK AWAY." THIS CONFERENCE AND OTHERS LIKE IT CONTRIBUTE TO DEVELOPING THE OTHER INSTRUMENTS FOR WAGING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT. WE CANNOT AND MUST NOT WALK AWAY.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: WHAT IS IT?

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT PRESENTS US WITH A MAJOR NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGE. UNFORTUNATELY, THE MEANING OF "LIC" STILL LIES IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER. JUST WHAT IS IT THAT CONCERNS US SO MUCH? AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE, NSDD 277 DEFINES "LIC" AS POLITICAL-MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN CONTENDING STATES OR GROUPS, BELOW CONVENTIONAL WAR, AND ABOVE THE ROUTINE, PEACEFUL COMPETITION AMONG STATES. IT INVOLVES PROTRACTED STRUGGLES OF COMPETING PRINCIPLES AND IDEOLOGIES. LIC RANGES FROM SUBVERSION TO THE USE OF ARMED FORCE. IT IS WAGED BY A COMBINATION OF MEANS EMPLOYING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, INFORMATIONAL, AND MILITARY INSTRUMENTS. THESE CONFLICTS ARE OFTEN LOCALIZED, GENERALLY IN THE THIRD WORLD, BUT CONTAIN REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS.

THE IMPORTANT THING TO REMEMBER IS THAT "LIC" IS A STRATEGY OF CONFLICT, WHERE DILATORY TACTICS ARE EMPLOYED WITH

INCREASING VIOLENCE TO WEAR DOWN THE OPPONENT. AS JEAN-PAUL SARTRE PUT IT, "(THE INSURGENT) TIRES OUT HIS ADVERSARY UNTIL THEY ARE SICK OF HIM." TO THE INSURGENT, "LIC" IS A PROCESS; TO US, IT'S AN EVENT. THE DIFFERENCE IS FUNDAMENTAL.

I KNOW THAT THE MILITARY CONSIDERS FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE, CONTINGENCIES, PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, AND COUNTERTERRORISM AS "LIC" MISSIONS. I BELIEVE THAT ONE DAY YOU WILL ADD COUNTERNARCOTICS, NARCOTERRORISM AND THE ADVERSARIAL ACTIONS OF STATES GOVERNED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY BY NARCOTIC CARTELS AS DISCRETE LIC TASKS.

WE ARE ONLY BEGINNING TO COME TO GRIPS WITH DEFINING THE LIC ISSUE COHERENTLY, ATTACKING IT ANALYTICALLY AND COUNTERING IT OPERATIONALLY. AND, WHILE MANY PARTS OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY MACHINERY ARE -- OR SOON WILL BECOME -- INVOLVED IN CONFRONTING THE THREATS POSED BY LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, THE FOUNDATION OF OUR EFFORTS TO MEET THESE THREATS LIES IN INTELLIGENCE -- IN UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM, COLLECTING INFORMATION AND ANALYZING IT, IN PROVIDING THE DECISIONMAKER WITH A FRAMEWORK AND, INCREASINGLY OFTEN, THE MEANS FOR COMBATTING IT.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IS THE "WEAPON OF CHOICE" IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND ITS MANY MANIFESTATIONS CONSTITUTE THE SLINGS AND ARROWS OF AVAILABILITY AND ECONOMY AGAINST LARGER, MORE

DEVELOPED POWERS WHOSE DEFENSES ARE DESIGNED PRIMARILY FOR NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL MILITARY CONFLICTS AND WHOSE STRENGTHS ARE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES. IT IS A CLASSIC CASE OF THE CAPACITY TO DESTROY ARRAYED AGAINST THE CAPACITY TO BUILD.

ALL OF THIS BRINGS ME BACK TO SECRETARY SHULTZ'S STATEMENT THAT LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IS OUR PRIMARY CHALLENGE THROUGH THE REST OF THIS CENTURY. IT ALSO BRINGS ME TO THE FOCUS OF MY REMARKS HERE -- THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN SUPPORT OF OUR EFFORTS TO MANAGE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT.

THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ONCE ALLOCATED ALMOST ALL OF ITS RESOURCES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA, BUT THIS HAS CHANGED DRAMATICALLY OVER THE LAST DECADE. AS THE CHALLENGES OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT HAVE GROWN OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS RESPONDED. THE COMMUNITY STARTED AN AGGRESSIVE REBUILDING PROGRAM IN THE EARLY '80S THAT HAS COME TO INCLUDE, TO A GREAT DEGREE, THE INTELLIGENCE INGREDIENTS OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT SUPPORT. WE HAVE ADDED TO OUR AGENCIES A SIZEABLE NUMBER OF OPERATIONS OFFICERS, ATTACHES AND ANALYSTS IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND GREATLY EXPANDED OUR INFORMATION BASE ON THE THIRD WORLD. WE'VE ESTABLISHED THE CENTRAL AMERICA JOINT INTELLIGENCE TEAM, A JOINT TERRORIST

CENTER, AND BUILT A COMMUNITY TERRORIST DATA BASE. WE'VE DEVELOPED BETTER AND QUICKER WAYS TO DELIVER SIGINT AND IMAGERY SUPPORT TO THE FIELD. WE'RE NOW WORKING TO STRENGTHEN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE WAR ON OVERSEAS NARCOTICS PRODUCTION AND NETWORKS. TIME AND AGAIN IN RECENT YEARS, FROM GRENADA TO THE ACHILLE LAURO TO MAJOR OFFENSIVES AGAINST DRUG REFINERIES AND NETWORKS, WE HAVE MADE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO SUCCESSFUL US ACTIONS AND POLICIES, AND AT THE SAME TIME, USED EACH EXPERIENCE TO STRENGTHEN OUR CAPABILITIES EVEN MORE.

INTELLIGENCE HAS TWO ROLES TO PLAY IN LIC. THE FIRST IS STRATEGIC--TO ANTICIPATE CHALLENGES TO THIS COUNTRY AND ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES AND THEREBY PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR PREVENTIVE--OR DAMAGE LIMITING--MEASURES TO PREEMPT OR LIMIT THOSE CHALLENGES. THE WHOLE IDEA IS TO DEAL WITH THESE CHALLENGES EARLY, WHEN THEY ARE MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO OUTSIDE INFLUENCE, AND IN TIME TO PRECLUDE THE NEED FOR DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION. TO DO THIS, WE MUST LEARN MORE ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD AND PROVIDE EARLY WARNING OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS THAT FORESHADOW INSTABILITY AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPLOITATION. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE HAVE IN PLACE RESOURCES TO CARRY OUT THIS TASK.

THE SECOND ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IS TACTICAL SUPPORT, BOTH INFORMATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL, ONCE OUR GOVERNMENT DECIDES TO REACT TO A SPECIFIC THREAT. THE IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE AT THIS LEVEL IS TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION WITHOUT THE INTRODUCTION OF US COMBAT FORCES, TO PROVIDE AN ENVIRONMENT WITHIN WHICH OUR BROADER NATION BUILDING EFFORT CAN BE UNDERTAKEN. WE ARE USUALLY TRYING TO BUY TIME FOR THE HOST COUNTRY TO GET ITS ACT TOGETHER, THE PREMISE BEING THAT IT IS THEIR STRUGGLE AND THEY MUST FIGHT IT.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT TARGETS ARE MORE DIFFICULT IN CERTAIN RESPECTS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO ADDRESS THAN THE TRADITIONAL SOVIET INTELLIGENCE TARGET. SPECIFIC THREATS ARE ALL TOO OFTEN VERY DIFFICULT TO FORECAST. THEY ARE RARELY FORESEEN IN TIME TO HAVE ANY IMPACT ON SCHEDULED PROGRAMMATIC ACTIONS, AND FREQUENTLY THEY OCCUR IN AREAS WHERE WE HAVE LITTLE OR NO INTELLIGENCE INFRASTRUCTURE. LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS ARE OFTEN LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AND DEMAND DEPENDENCE AS WELL ON TRADITIONAL HUMINT, TACTICAL SIGNALS AND RECONNAISSANCE MEANS, AND ANALYSIS. MAKING MATTERS STILL WORSE, ACCESS TO THE LOCAL COUNTRY MAY BE DENIED TO US AND OFTEN THERE MAY BE NO OFFICIAL US PRESENCE OF ANY KIND. WHEN WE HAVE NOT ADEQUATELY ANTICIPATED A LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT SITUATION, WE OFTEN MUST QUICKLY DEVELOP AN ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE INFRASTRUCTURE.

ONE ASPECT OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT THAT IS COMMON TO MANY LOW INTENSITY OPERATIONS INVOLVES SUPPORTING FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS,--IN MOST CASES, THIRD WORLD GOVERNMENTS. PERHAPS THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT CHALLENGE IS INSTILLING IN HOST GOVERNMENTS A SENSE OF THE CRITICAL ROLE OF EARLY AND CONSISTENT USE OF INTELLIGENCE. WE ARE REPEATEDLY FINDING THAT THIS IS OUR NUMBER ONE PRIORITY AND PROBLEM. WHAT OFTEN HOLDS US BACK, HOWEVER, IS THAT IN MANY THIRD WORLD AREAS THE TERM "INTELLIGENCE" IS OFTEN SYNONYMOUS WITH "INTERNAL SECURITY". THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT CULTURAL, POWER AND RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS OF FOCUSING THE COUNTRY'S ATTENTION ON "INTELLIGENCE". EVEN AFTER THE VALUE OF TRUE INTELLIGENCE IS ACCEPTED, THERE REMAINS THE TASK OF ORGANIZING AND APPLYING TIMELY AND SUSTAINED INTELLIGENCE. WE IN THE UNITED STATES MAY BELIEVE THAT INTELLIGENCE IS ONE OF THE KEY INGREDIENTS TO SUCCESS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS, BUT IF WE DON'T CONVINCE THE LOCAL LEADERSHIP, IT CAN'T PLAY ITS CRUCIAL AND BENEFICIAL ROLE.

COMMON TO MUCH OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IS THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING "TARGET SMART". LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT MAY BE MOSTLY A CONCEPTUAL ISSUE IN WASHINGTON, BUT IN THE FIELD IT CAN CONCERN MINUTIAE ABOUT EXACT WAREHOUSE LOCATIONS AND SUCH SMALL DETAILS AS WHICH WAY DOORS OPEN. FAILURE TO KNOW THESE KINDS

OF DETAILS CAN LITERALLY BE FATAL. USUALLY WE NEED TO WORK HARD WITH THE LOCAL COUNTRY'S TARGETING AND ANALYSIS PEOPLE AND ENCOURAGE SUPPORT BY THE PROPER LOCAL USERS TO INSTILL AN APPRECIATION FOR THIS.

ANOTHER REQUIREMENT IS THE NEED TO BUILD, OR AT LEAST IMPROVE LOCAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS. THIS OFTEN CALLS UPON US TO PROVIDE DIRECT SIGINT, IMAGERY AND HUMAN COLLECTION SUPPORT AND PRODUCT CAPABILITIES FOR A SUSTAINED PERIOD. IT ALSO FREQUENTLY MEANS TAILORING OUR OWN COLLECTION SYSTEMS OR EVEN DEVISING NEW SYSTEMS PECULIAR TO THE LOCAL REQUIREMENTS.

WE MUST ALSO HELP WITH DEVELOPING AND PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATIONS AND TRAINING. VERY OFTEN, INTELLIGENCE IS AVAILABLE IN THE CAPITAL BUT DOES NOT REACH UNITS IN THE FIELD ON A TIMELY BASIS. MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, GOVERNMENT FORCES ARE USING COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES THAT ARE WIDE OPEN TO COMPROMISE, ANOTHER FACTOR WHICH WEAKENS THEIR ABILITY TO RESPOND FORCEFULLY AND ERODES MORALE.

FURTHER WE MUST FOCUS ON THE CRITICAL NEED FOR MANY OF OUR ALLIES IN THE THIRD WORLD TO IMPROVE THEIR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES. THIS IS PARTICULARLY VALUABLE TO INSURGENCY OPERATIONS WHERE AGENT PENETRATION CAN HAVE A DEVASTATING EFFECT.

FINALLY, I SHOULD POINT OUT THAT INTELLIGENCE SERVES NUMEROUS OTHER PURPOSES RELATED TO LIC. WE PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT TO FRIENDLY AND ALLIED COUNTRIES, SUPPORT RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS, AID IN THE SUPPRESSION OF DRUGS, AND WORK TO DETER AND RESPOND TO TERRORISM. AND WE REGULARLY DEVELOP INTELLIGENCE IN SUPPORT OF OTHER NATIONAL-LEVEL ACTIVITIES, RANGING FROM SECURITY ASSISTANCE, AID, TRADE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES, SUCH AS PROMOTING DEMOCRACY. ALL OF THESE ACTIVITIES GO TO THE HEART OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT.

MANAGEMENT

LET ME COMMENT BRIEFLY ON THE MANAGEMENT IMPACT OF ALL THIS. MUCH OF THE MANAGEMENT PROBLEM RELATES TO THE ISSUES THAT I MENTIONED JUST A MOMENT AGO OF SETTING PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATING RESOURCES. HERE IS AN AREA WHERE WE CAN USE YOUR HELP.

I THINK WE'D ALL AGREE THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY NEEDS TO PLACE SPECIAL FOCUS, ON A COMMUNITY-WIDE BASIS, ON LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT ISSUES, AT LEAST TO ASSURE THAT WE UNDERSTAND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND CAN IMPROVE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT. BUT WE MUST ALSO REMEMBER THAT INTELLIGENCE IS A SUPPORTING COMMUNITY AND NOT A POLICYMAKING

ORGANIZATION. NO MAJOR SHIFTS OF RESOURCES OR PRIORITIES CAN BE SUSTAINED WITHOUT A POLICY CONSENSUS. WE ARE SEEING SUCH A CONSENSUS DEVELOP AROUND COUNTERTERRORISM AND DRUG ENFORCEMENT.

THE MANAGEMENT OF OUR COLLECTION ASSETS IS ANOTHER ISSUE THAT CUTS ACROSS PRIORITIES IN ALLOCATING AND MELDING RESOURCES. THERE IS NO QUESTION BUT THAT OUR CLASSIC COLLECTORS DO A TERRIFIC JOB COLLECTING AGAINST LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT TARGETS AND THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO BE TASKED. AT THE SAME TIME THE OLD "KEEP IT SIMPLE" RULE IS UNQUESTIONABLY ESSENTIAL TO LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT COLLECTION. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE WHEN ONE OF YOUR OBJECTIVES IS ULTIMATELY TO TURN THE COLLECTION AND THE COLLECTOR OVER TO THE HOST COUNTRY. HERE IS ANOTHER PLACE WHERE TECHNOLOGY--PARTICULARLY LOW COST, SIMPLE TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN TECHNOLOGY--CAN HELP.

ANOTHER CHALLENGE WE, AS MANAGERS, CONFRONT IS THE DIFFICULTY OF ANTICIPATING THE NEXT HOT SPOT AND COMMITTING RESOURCES. WHO COULD HAVE ANTICIPATED IN 1980 THAT GRENADA OR EVEN LEBANON WOULD BECOME THE FOCUS OF US MILITARY ACTION. HOW COULD WE ALLOCATE RESOURCES WELL IN ADVANCE TO BE READY FOR CRISES IN THE LONG LIST OF COUNTRIES, MANY OF THEM SMALL AND OBSCURE, WHERE THE US HAS SUPPORTED FRIENDS OR ALLIES IN RECENT YEARS?

THIS PLACES A PREMIUM ON SURGE CAPABILITIES THAT CAN DEPEND ON ALREADY EXISTING DATA BASES, AND SPECIALISTS ON THE GENERAL ART OF COMBATING OR WAGING INSURGENCIES, OF COUNTERING AND THWARTING TERRORISM, OF TACKLING NARCOTICS NETWORKS. WE NEED A CORE OF EXPERTS -- STILL THIN AND FRAGILE -- IN EACH AREA TO ENSURE THAT NEW TACTICS, NEW INFORMATION AND OLD AND NEW EXPERIENCE ARE ADEQUATELY INTEGRATED. THIS OFTEN WILL REQUIRE BUREAUCRATIC FLEXIBILITY TO CREATE NEW ORGANIZATIONS AS THEY ARE NEEDED, AS WELL AS THE INNOVATIVENESS TO IDENTIFY WAYS IN WHICH AMERICAN STRENGTHS -- ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, TECHNOLOGICAL -- CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR. AND IT PUTS A PREMIUM ON PROTECTING EXPERTISE EVEN ON SMALL, CURRENTLY OR SEEMINGLY UNIMPORTANT COUNTRIES.

FINALLY, LET ME ADDRESS A CRITICALLY IMPORTANT ASPECT OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT. FOR FAR TOO LONG, WE HAVE BEEN CONTENT TO BE PASSIVE PARTICIPANTS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT. WE COLLECT INFORMATION, WE ANALYZE IT, AND WE SEND REPORTS TO POLICY AGENCIES AND OFFICIALS. YET, WE KNOW -- AS I SAID BEFORE -- THAT TRADITIONAL DIPLOMACY AND MILITARY MEASURES ARE USUALLY NOT EFFECTIVE AGAINST LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT -- ESPECIALLY INSURGENCIES, COUNTERINSURGENCIES, TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION. OFTEN THE MOST EFFECTIVE OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AVAILABLE ARE THOSE EITHER IN INTELLIGENCE OR ARE DEEPLY DEPENDENT UPON THE AGGRESSIVE USE OF INTELLIGENCE. WE IN

INTELLIGENCE MUST THINK OFFENSIVELY ABOUT OUR ROLE. COVERT ACTION; INTELLIGENCE TRAINING, COLLECTION, AND TARGETING INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANCE TO FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS THREATENED BY COMMUNIST INSURGENCIES; ACTION TO THWART, DISRUPT, FRUSTRATE, AND DIVIDE TERRORIST GROUPS; THE PINPOINTING OF VULNERABILITIES OF TERRORIST AND NARCOTICS NETWORKS; THE PUBLIC EXPOSURE OF SUBVERSIVE, TERRORIST AND NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES; AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW STRATEGIES, TACTICS AND TECHNOLOGIES TO WAGE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ARE BUT SOME OF THE MANY WAYS INTELLIGENCE CAN HELP COMBAT LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT EFFECTIVELY. BUT WE CAN NO LONGER THINK OR BEHAVE AS PASSIVE OBSERVERS. WE IN INTELLIGENCE ARE THE SHOCK TROOPS OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT. MANAGERS MUST LEAD THIS CHANGE IN ATTITUDE AND PRIORITY.

FUTURE CHALLENGES

LET ME CLOSE WITH A PERSONAL OBSERVATION ABOUT LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO APPRECIATE THAT LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IS PREEMINENTLY STILL -- WAR WITHOUT DECLARATION, WITHOUT MOBILIZATION, WITHOUT MASSIVE ARMIES. IT IS, IN MANY RESPECTS, THAT LONG TWILIGHT WAR DESCRIBED A QUARTER CENTURY AGO BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY.

IN AFGHANISTAN, ANGOLA, CAMBODIA, THE PERSIAN GULF AND ELSEWHERE WE ARE SEEING THE FRUITS OF AMERICAN POLICIES AND PROGRAMS. MAJOR CHANGES ARE UNDERWAY INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION AND THE BLOC COUNTRIES. BUT IT IS CRITICAL FOR US TO MAINTAIN OUR VIGILANCE. WE CANNOT ALLOW THESE CURRENTLY FAVORABLE--AND WELCOME--DEVELOPMENTS TO LULL US INTO A WEAKENED SECURITY POSTURE, ESPECIALLY REGARDING INTELLIGENCE. INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES WILL BE INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT, AS WE SEEK TO ANTICIPATE CHANGE AND PROVIDE EARLY WARNING OF IMPENDING THREATS OR SITUATIONS THAT DEMAND ATTENTION.

THIRD TIER COUNTRIES AND SUBNATIONAL GROUPS WILL BE FAR MORE SOPHISTICATED IN CONDUCTING LOW INTENSITY WAR THAN THEY ARE TODAY. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENTS IN RECENT YEARS SEEM TO FAVOR THE ADVERSARY MORE THAN GOVERNMENTS. INDEED, SOME ELEMENTS, SUCH AS THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS, ARE OFTEN BETTER ARMED AND EQUIPPED THAN THE GOVERNMENT FORCES THEY FACE. SOME OF THE MOST ADVANCED ARMAMENTS ARE NOW AVAILABLE ON THE LEGITIMATE AND GRAY ARMS MARKETS. MILITARY POWER ITSELF NO LONGER SERVES TO DETER THOSE ADVERSARIES WHOSE STRATEGY IS ONE OF THE INDIRECT APPROACH. THUS MORE SOPHISTICATED AND ENDURING APPROACHES ARE REQUIRED TO DEAL WITH THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF LIC, TO INHIBIT THE GROWTH OF MILITANT INSURGENCIES.

YOU KNOW THAT SHRINKING BUDGETS WILL INEVITABLY LEAD TO INCREASED FRICTION BETWEEN AND AMONG THE VARIOUS COMPETING AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT. ACCORDINGLY WE NEED--PERHAPS MORE SO THAN AT ANY EARLIER TIME--TO RISE ABOVE PAROCHIAL CONCERNS AND LOOK TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST. A STRENGTHENED INTELLIGENCE POSTURE IN THE THIRD WORLD WOULD BE A STRONG INDICATOR OF OUR COMMITMENT TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THIS INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ARENA OF CONFLICT.

LET ME CONCLUDE BY NOTING THAT AS YOU CONSIDER LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND HOW TO DEAL WITH IT, IT IS IMPERATIVE TO REMEMBER THAT THE SOURCES, THE WELLSPRINGS OF SUCH CONFLICT OFTEN ARE STILL GOVERNMENTS. AND, I FURTHER SUBMIT TO YOU THAT, AS IN THE PAST FORTY YEARS, THESE POLITICAL-MILITARY WARS OF VARYING SCALE WILL DEMAND OUR ATTENTION AND THAT OF OUR LEADERS AS FAR INTO THE FUTURE AS WE CAN SEE. IF WE DENY OR SIMPLY FAIL TO RECOGNIZE THAT MOST LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IS WAR AND OFTEN IS CONDUCTED OR SUSTAINED BY STATES AND FORCES DEEPLY HOSTILE TO US, WE WILL UNDERESTIMATE ITS DURABILITY, ITS DANGER TO US, AND ITS SCOPE.

I SET FORTH THESE PROPOSITIONS AND ANALYSIS BECAUSE TOO MANY TREAT LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AS A NEW AND NARROWLY VIEWED PHENOMENON, THE LATEST FAD--THE NEWEST BANDWAGON BUREAUCRACIES AND CONTRACTORS ALIKE ARE CLIMBING ABOARD BECAUSE IT'S PERCEIVED TO BE WHERE THE ACTION AND THE DOLLARS ARE. IF WE FAIL TO SEE THE LARGER STRATEGIC PICTURE, IF WE IGNORE THE LESSONS WE CAN LEARN FROM OUR PAST EXPERIENCE IN THESE CONFLICTS, IF WE REGARD LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AS A TRANSITORY PHENOMENON RATHER THAN AN ENDURING ELEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT TO BE STRATEGICALLY MANAGED, THEN WE WILL CONSTANTLY BE ON THE DEFENSIVE, WE WILL BE REACTING--DANCING TO THE TUNE OF SUBVERSION AND AGGRESSION, OF TERRORISTS AND DRUG DEALERS. WE MUST DEVELOP REALISTIC POLICIES, PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THOSE POLICIES AND MAKE THE LONG TERM INVESTMENT IN RESOURCES, TECHNOLOGY AND INFORMATION ESSENTIAL TO OVERCOMING OR WINNING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS.